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Abstract: Recent years and modern warfare have shown an increasing reliance on the cyber domain to maintain national and 
military operability, resulting in cyber exploits having a more profound impact on victim nations. As the United States seeks 
to maximize its ability to capitalize on these exploits and minimize its susceptibility, a decision must be made on the most 
effective way to accomplish these tasks. Currently, each major department within the Department of Defense (DoD) are 
methodically building up their own cyber assets to accomplish these tasks as they relate to their traditional domain. There has 
been a recent proposal to do away with this system structure and instead create a separate Cyber Department, on the same 
level as the Army, Navy, etc. This paper evaluates the comparative value between the two proposals through value modeling. 
The value model is based on each alternative’s ability to achieve the end state cyber goals of the DoD and the nation as a 
whole. Strong indicators point towards a separate Cyber Department as the most valuable alternative available to achieve the 
nation’s goals, and that there are current weaknesses within our current cyber structure that are open for exploitation. 
Keywords: Cyber , Cyber Security, Department of Defense Reorganization, National Security, Cyber Department, Cyber 
Command Structure, Cyber Domain, Cyber Assets, Modern Warfare 
1. Introduction
The aim of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to ensure the survival of the United States via the accumulation and 
training of the necessary resources that guarantee its ability to protect the United States. This protection can take many forms 
from both defensive tactics to offensive movements that ensure the future security of the nation. Immediate defensive 
strategies focus on the countering and mitigation of vulnerabilities in the securing of national assets, while offensive 
strategies are focused on exploiting these weaknesses in opposing nations. During recent years, the emergent cyber domain 
has highlighted both current weaknesses in and future opportunities for the DoD. In recent years, the utilization of cyber 
assets to assist in the conventional methods of warfare has increasingly risen to prominence, both domestically and abroad. 
Notably, the Stuxnet virus brought to bear the overarching capabilities and reach that cyber weapons hold (Langner, 2011). 
The conventional sense of cyber warfare tends to be associated solely with digital implications such as information 
compromise, blocking information and signal reception, and/or the shutdown of electronic assets. However, cyber warfare is 
very much capable of causing physical damage, and the Stuxnet attack of 2009 proved just that. Stuxnet targeted the 
industrial controllers of Iranian nuclear facilities through malware that was specifically designed for controllers manufactured 
by Siemens (Langner, 2011). After gaining access to the controller and verifying that it was the correct target type, Stuxnet 
then caused valves on centrifuges in the nuclear facilities to increase the pressure within them to the point that they broke 
(Zetter, 2014). For the first time the world was truly exposed to the type and scale of damage that cyber warfare is capable of, 
and ever since the Stuxnet attack, countries around the world have been in competition to build cyber assets to capitalize on 
these capabilities. 
The growing cyber capabilities of near-peer nations has been on display in the past couple of years. In 2016, Ukraine 
experienced a cyber-attack that operated on an unprecedented scale in terms of precision and number of users affected. 
Russia has denied culpability but is both accused by Ukraine as the culprit, as well as is pegged by leading cybersecurity 
analysts as the main suspect (Greenberg, 2017). These cyber-attacks once again highlighted the ability for cyber warfare to 
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cross over from the virtual to physical realm by effectively shutting down all electrical infrastructure for approximately 
225,000 customers (Lee, Assante & Conway, 2016). However, Ukraine was able to return services promptly due to their 
retention of manual override controls. Conversely, in the United States infrastructure system manual override controls are no 
longer present in control systems, and the security of these control systems are arguably worse than that of Ukraine; which 
indicates that a sophisticated blackout attack, like the one Ukraine suffered, could last much longer than a couple hours, in 
the range of weeks to months. Furthermore, recent analysis conducted by experts in this field concluded that the United 
States is only realistically prepared to survive a week of power outage before there is absolute chaos (Koppel, 2015). This 
means that the value of preventing cyberattacks is not in the scale of thousands or millions, but, with total losses combined, 
approaches the scale of billions and possibly even trillions, depending on the length of duration (Amadeo, 2018).  
These incidents highlight the massive damage that cyber-attacks are capable of, as well as emphasize the importance 
of the DoD’s method to both develop these weapons and prevent their use on US systems. Furthermore, the ability to grow 
offensive capabilities is just as vital to the DoD in terms of furthering military dominance, because these offensive 
capabilities exponentially increase the striking range of the DoD. In comparison to conventional warfare, where troops had to 
physically seize control of key military assets, offensive cyber capabilities open up the possibility of achieving this remotely. 
The DoD’s current policy for addressing this emergent field is the development of individual cyber branches within each 
Service. However, a recent proposal suggested creating a unique department within the DoD to solely focus on this domain 
(Stavridis & Weinstein, 2014). The purpose of this paper will be to identify weaknesses within current cyber integration 
methods and then determine if a unique Cyber Department would improve, maintain, or exacerbate these problems. The 
current cyber structure will be evaluated quantitatively, while the proposed Cyber Department will be analyzed partially 
quantitatively and partially qualitatively due to limited data.  
2. Underlying Assumptions
To analyze the current DoD system with that of an independent branch, some underlying assumptions must be made. 
First, the analysis will be based on five main value measures: integration with conventional forces, resource utilization, 
response time, effectiveness, and the ability to build future weapons.  Each of these measures contain unique reasons for their 
importance that are derived from the Army Cyber Command Mission Statement ("U.S. Army Cyber Command | The U.S. 
Army", 2018). The decomposition of these measures is shown in the value hierarchy in Figure 1. Secondly, since there is not 
a fully simulated version of what the actual DoD proposal for a separate Cyber Department would resemble, the values for a 
separate Cyber Department will be mainly based off how current DoD departments are structured and interact with each 
other. Third, each of the values will be benchmarked in 25-point intervals due to the limited information concerning the exact 
interactions between differences in values and department performance.  
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Figure 1: Value Hierarchy of DoD Cyber Assets 
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Precise performance data and the resulting distributions are assessed internally and not made public. However, since 
the general correlations between these values and system performance are known, it is a reasonable assumption to break 
down these values similarly and with incremental jumps between value assignments. The generation of these value 
measurements and scores are shown below in Figure 1 and Table 1, respectively.  
 
Table 1. Value Scale of DoD Cyber Assets 
 
 
 
The first value measure, integration with conventional forces, is defined by the operational unit level that is able to 
utilize cyber resources. The ability to integrate is a critical test in modern warfare due to the necessity of integration for cyber 
forces to successfully support and increase the effectiveness of conventional forces (U.S. Army Cyber Command, 2016). 
Without tight integration with conventional forces, limitations are imposed on the precision of cyber-attacks due to the 
confines of attacks based off of strategic level information. However, when cyber forces are tightly integrated with 
conventional forces, the latter can call in precise target locations and desired assets (i.e. drone reconnaissance, drone attacks, 
denial of service attacks on specific servers, etc.) at the forward deployed level, thereby maximizing mutual benefits. This 
would optimize both the conventional forces ability to eliminate threats through targeted takedowns of key enemy assets as 
well as optimize the tactical aspect of cyber forces’ support of the mission. Integration will be one of the most important 
values assessed because of its necessity for meeting the requirements of modern warfare, where smaller and smaller units are 
predicted to operate independently (Barno & Bensahel, 2017). The scale for integration, as well as the other value measures, 
are displayed above in Table 1. 
Resource utilization is a key component of testing system effectiveness, due to the environment in which national 
cyber forces will be funded and developed. Both options currently being discussed for cyber forces are government assets 
that will be funded by taxes. As a result, it is the duty of the government to ensure that taxpayers’ funds are being used to 
develop the most resource optimal solution possible and to minimize expenditures. Resource utilization is defined as the 
elimination of redundant resources being utilized for similar purposes throughout the DoD. Resource utilization is an 
Value 
Measure 0 25 50 75 100 
Integration Cyber utilization at the strategic level 
Cyber utilization at 
the division level 
Cyber utilization at 
the brigade level 
Cyber utilization 
at the battalion 
level 
Cyber utilization at 
the platoon level 
Resource 
Maximization 
Similar resources with 
a similar mission set 
being represented in 
every DoD department 
Similar resources in 
every DoD 
department with 
slightly different 
mission sets 
Similar cyber 
resources in every 
DoD department, 
but unique mission 
sets 
Related cyber 
resources in every 
DoD department 
and unique 
mission sets 
No repetition of 
similar resources 
with a similar 
mission in any 
DoD department 
Flexibility >72 hours to deploy assets 
24-72 hours to deploy 
assets 
12-24 hours to 
deploy assets 
2-12 hours to 
deploy assets 
<2 hours to deploy 
assets 
Effectiveness 
Ineffective offensive 
and defensive cyber 
Domains 
One ineffective 
domain, one 
moderately effective 
domain 
One extremely 
effective domain, 
one ineffective 
domain/ two 
moderate domains 
One extremely 
effective domain, 
one moderate 
domain 
Extremely effective 
offensive and 
defensive 
capabilities 
Ability to 
Build Future 
Weapons 
No innovative overlap 
between cyber assets 
Slight overlap 
between cyber assets 
Intermediate 
overlap between 
cyber assets 
High levels of 
overlap and 
communication 
between cyber 
assets 
Complete overlap 
of cyber research 
and circulation of 
research and 
innovation between 
all cyber assets 
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incredibly important value measure due to the recent debates over military budgeting. Therefore showing the taxpayers that 
they are getting the absolute most for their money is critical to ensuring the successful resourcing of the DoD as a whole 
(McCarthy, 2018). 
Response time is another vital aspect to determining system effectiveness due to the nature of war, especially in the 
cyber domain. Entire wars have been characterized by moments of action, and in the cyber realm this is fast forwarded to an 
unprecedented level. Cyberattacks can occur without notice and leave only a limited window of opportunity open for a 
counterattack that mitigates impact. Furthermore, the damage that cyberattacks cause exponentially increases the longer the 
response time is delayed. ("Cyber Incident Response: What Is It, And Why Do You Need It? - Securonix", 2017). Response 
time is defined as how quickly the command structure is able to deploy a significant level of assets (i.e. traditionally a 
company sized unit or higher) on an immediate threat, opportunity, or respond to an attack.  Response time is relatively 
important due to the necessity for quick responses to the ever present threat level of the post-Cold War world (Hermes, 
2001). The scale for response time is displayed in Table 1 and is capped at 72 hours due to the correlation between response 
time and containment time (Kilcarr, 2016). The corresponding times between response and containment indicate that past 72 
hours would push full containment over the week estimate for the United States ability to avoid chaos. 
Effectiveness is critical to system performance due to the inherent nature of required effectiveness for system 
functionality. Effectiveness will be a combination of the qualitative measurements of cyber capabilities in the offensive and 
defensive domain. Ultimately, effectiveness is the most important value that will be measured, because this is the ultimate 
determination of what command structure will best facilitate the mission of the DoD, which is to protect and defend the 
American people and way of life (Department of Defense, 2018). 
Finally, for a domain with the rapid innovation rate that cyber has where new technology possible becomes obsolete 
within a couple weeks and not years, the ability to build future weapons both efficiently and rapidly is critical to the 
capability of the United States to maintain its lead in military lethality. The ability to build future weapons is defined as the 
amount of innovation fostered by the command structure, because innovation is the defining feature of new product 
development. Ability to build future weapons is the lowest weighted value due to two factors: the prevailing necessity to 
focus on current cyber issues before those of the future and the inability to accurately predict what drives innovation. Fortune 
500 Companies spend hundreds of millions of dollar trying to foster innovation without achieving a finite definition as to 
what drives innovation. Innovation can spring from any source in any place due to the unpredictability of the human mind, 
however there are certain rules that, in general, help to foster a more innovative environment, such as grouping similar 
projects/engineers next to each other, encouraging the sharing of information between likeminded personnel, etc. (Albury, 
2005).  
The one major value that will not be assessed in this paper is that of cost. There are a few limitations and 
assumptions that necessitate this step in building an accurate model. The first of which is the lack of accurate data on the cost 
of a Cyber Department capable of dealing with national defense and offense tactics. In just the past decade alone, the 
importance of cyber has grown at an exponential and unpredictable rate, which is why scaling is such an important aspect of 
the response time value (Choucri, Madnick & Ferwerda, 2013). Furthermore, the nature of the domain means that large 
breakthroughs will continue to create nearly instantaneous effects, which makes the future growth rates necessary to meet 
demand nearly impossible to accurately predict. Without more predictable growth rates, a fully costed price tag for the 
system is unreliable as well. Second, in the current structure there is no truly reliable source of cost data. The Army Cyber 
Department is a little over four years old and is very much in the building phase. Publicly available cost data for a classified 
department is still many years away. Finally, the major assumption that allows for the negating of these limitations is the 
exponentially rising cost of potential cyber-attacks, calculated in both monetary value to repair damages as well as the 
opportunity cost of having critical systems shut down for an extended period of time, makes the cost of any significant 
improvement in cyber capabilities a dominating option. This assumption is reasonably backed up by the high fines imposed 
daily on US infrastructure systems that do not comply with national cyber guidelines, due to this very reason (Sullivan & 
Kamensky, 2017). 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
These criteria were evaluated through a value model that used outside sources to assess value levels for each 
alternative and assign weights based on the relative importance of the value, briefly discussed above. The resulting model 
outputs are displayed below [Table 2 and Figure 2]. Notably, the separate Cyber Department alternative was evaluated 
through both the historical analogy for the creation of the Air Force as well as extrapolation of current system readiness 
levels in current DoD Departments, since there is very little data on an actual Cyber Department. 
For integration, the current cyber structure received a 25 because of the current process by which Army Cyber 
officers are being integrated into the force. Currently upon completion of their Basic Officer Leadership Course where they 
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are taught how to be cyber officers, they can post to certain command elements where there are National Security Agency 
(NSA) outposts. This indicates that Army Cyber officers are being grouped at the division level since they are post specific 
and are not fully integrated into lower level units. For resource utilization, the current cyber structure was assigned a 25 due 
to the current buildup of similar assets in every DoD department with slightly different mission sets. The main difference in 
their mission sets stems from their dedication to supporting their specific branch, and not an actual difference in domain-
specific goals. This is exemplified in the same specifications being used to determine cyber readiness across the different 
services (Pomerleau, 2017a). The current cyber structure scored a 50 on response time due to the scale of time it would take 
to deploy a company-sized element. Under the current system, quick reaction force companies have been developed within 
the Army that would facilitate a deployment of within 24 hours (Cox, 2018). The current cyber structure score a 25 on 
effectiveness due to the current ineffectiveness in creating a holistic, national cyber defense while maintaining a moderate 
offensive effectiveness level. This can be seen in the far ranging limitations in current US cyber networks that would leave it 
open to an attack similar to the one demonstrated in Ukraine (Greenberg, 2017). Whereas in the offensive realm, the US has 
shown moderate capabilities to deploy cyber-attacks, as seen in Stuxnet. However, US Military Forces have been unable to 
fully leverage the cyber domain in current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, via the domination of the cyber domain to amplify 
units’ warfighting capabilities (Commons, 2018). The combination of these factors leads to a rating of moderate for offensive 
capabilities. 
A separate Cyber Department was assigned a value of 75 for integration because of the current integration level of 
combined arms warfare within the DoD. Due to recent counter insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the capability 
for the DoD to conduct combined arms warfare has dropped from pre-Global War on Terror levels. This is due to the 
necessity for counterinsurgency operations to focus on the protection of the civilian population, which has led to isolated 
units focusing on their area and to work at smaller unit levels that can better interact with the populace. The result of this 
lower unit level focus is that the DoD’s ability to conduct combined arms warfare has dropped due to the limited necessity 
and training between units and departments to mass their destructive effects. However, the current capability within the DoD 
to conduct combined arms warfare between Departments is still assessed to be at the battalion commander level and still 
notably higher than the current cyber structure (Richardson, 2012). The assumption as to why separate departments would 
have a higher integration level than units within the department itself comes down to resource allocation. Right now cyber 
officers are too sparse in the Army to effectively integrate at levels lower than the division due to the essential ownership of 
assets by command levels, which leads to the issue where commanders are reluctant to relinquish control of assets assigned to 
them. However, a Cyber Department could pool personnel and then transition from Department to Department as needed 
when in the area of operation.  
The Cyber Department was assigned a value of 75 for resource utilization because of the past precedent of the 
transformation of the Army Air Corps into a separate entity known as the Air Force. While the Air Force took the majority of 
air assets, each department created air assets with unique technological factors that made them essential to their mission 
accomplishment. This is highlighted in the specialization of the Army in helicopters in order to facilitate troop movements 
through vertical takeoffs and the specialization of the Navy in carrier-equipped jets in order to facilitate overhead firepower 
in naval battles ("Army Air Forces - United States Army Aviation", 2018). Therefore, it is assumed that the creation of a 
Cyber Department would follow the same path, whereby the majority of cyber assets and mission sets that overlapped 
between the departments would be consumed by the new Cyber Department while each department would develop cyber 
assets that are actually critical and unique to their individual mission sets.  
The Cyber Department was assigned a value of 50 for response time due to the presumption that current 
mobilization rates would most likely not change with the creation of a new department. Since in the event of a mass 
mobilization scenario, each department secretary would be tasked with mobilization under the same time constraints, there 
would be no noticeable difference in the mobilization rates due to similar mobilization requirements. The effectiveness of a 
separate Cyber Department was ranked at 75 because of the comparable ratio in effectiveness that the Air Force underwent 
after their separation from the Army. After the separation, the Air Force suddenly became an equal to the Army both in the 
political realm and in importance of funding, which lead to a considerable increase in air power technology and airmen 
(Hammons, 2016). Paralleling this, the same could be expected to come true of a separate Cyber Department.  
The ability to build future weapons of a separate Cyber Department was valued at 75 due to the increased level of 
overlap that would result from a separate entity dedicated to cyber operations. The current cyber structure has assets scattered 
across three departments, where the natural barriers between departments hinder cooperation and innovation. A separate 
Cyber Department would partially remove these barriers by grouping all resources dedicated to cyber research and weapon 
creation in the same department and would most likely encourage the circulation of cyber related information, thereby 
fostering innovation (Albury, 2005). Realistically though there seems to be no cyber structure within the DoD that would 
achieve a score of 100 on the ability to build future weapons, since the necessity of a classification system hinders the 
possibility of unexpected innovators offering up their solution. However, a separate Cyber Department would go a long way 
towards maximizing the DoD’s ability to foster innovative solutions. 
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Due to the results of this research, it is recommended that the DoD further investigate and pursue the alternative to 
establish a separate Cyber Department. The benefits of separating domains into their own departments is evident in the 
historical example of the US Air Force. The US Air Force now dominates the world as a leader in air power technology and 
the same could be true of US cyber forces if a similar approach was taken (Attar, 2017). Without these added benefits of a 
Department dedicated to the emergent cyber domain, the US risks potentially losing the military edge it has maintained in the 
modern era. 
 
 
Table 2. Value Model Scores of Cyber Structures 
 
Value Measure Global Weight 
Unweighted Score   Weighted Score 
Current 
Cyber 
Structure 
Separate 
Cyber 
Branch 
  
Current 
Cyber 
Structure 
Separate 
Cyber 
Branch 
Integration 0.20 25 75  5.0 15.0 Resource Maximization 0.22 25 75  5.5 16.5 Flexibility 0.15 50 50  7.5 7.5 Effectiveness 0.30 25 75  7.5 22.5 Ability to Build Future Weapons 0.13 25 75  3.3 9.8 
Total Value Score 1.00       28.8 71.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Value Model Scores Graph of Cyber Structures 
 
 
4. Discussion and Future Work 
 
This analysis used primarily constructed scales tied to the inherent military cyber functions. The use of constructed 
scales are somewhat limiting in that they rely on interpretation of the current state of each alternative based on available 
information.  However, the results still show that with the current understanding of the cyber domain’s importance and pace 
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of innovation, a separate Cyber Department would prove to be the alternative best suited to achieve national goals. However, 
there are modifications that would strengthen the results of this research. First, access to higher levels of data concerning 
cyber structures and mission sets would increase the level of accuracy in the assignment of value measures. Furthermore, a 
higher level of data access would facilitate the implementation of the cost aspect of this model, due to the ability to review 
the classified documents surrounding the costing and structure of the current cyber structure as well as for the current DoD 
Departments. Finally, a confounding element of this research is a lack of clear and unifying mission set for the DoD cyber 
resources. Currently, most mission sets pushed down from the national level are vague and do not have tangible 
measurements. This is to be expected because of the ambiguity concerning exactly how the cyber domain will affect military 
operations as well as the current dilemma of confounding roles between the NSA and DoD Cyber Command. However, as 
this understanding and distinction begins to solidify in the future it is a necessity that hard and clear objectives begin to be 
issued (Pomerleau, 2017b). This would lead into the reevaluation and recalibration of this model according to the objectives 
defined by national statements and not just the objectives that are generally recommended for overarching cyber assets, both 
foreign and domestic.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The rising emergence of the cyber domain has shaken common understandings of how the military operates. A 
largely doctrinal and slow-moving organization is being forced to adapt its procedures at an unprecedented pace. This 
unprecedented pace is most notable in the comparison of timelines for the last major DoD department creation. The Army Air 
Corps was in operation for nearly thirty years before being spiraled off into the Air Force (Hammons, 2016). Whereas, the 
Army Cyber Branch has been in existence for a little over four years and there is already serious consideration of creating a 
separate department ("Timeline of Army Cyber", 2017). This does not reflect poorly on the ability of the Army, or other DoD 
departments, to fulfill cyber obligations, but is instead a reflection on the immense importance that the cyber domain holds in 
modern warfare. This paper has taken a step in the right direction for determining the cyber needs of the US Military by 
highlighting how a separate Cyber Department could propel our national defense industry forward in this new domain. 
However, much more needs to be done to ensure that if DoD decides to pursue a separate Cyber Department, it is 
implemented in a way that maximizes its impact. The ramifications of not doing so are already becoming apparent in global 
examples. 
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